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## INTERTEXTUALITY AS A SOURCE OF DISCOURSE EMOTIONALIZATION AND LANGUAGE INNOVATIONS

***Abstract.** The article is focused on the pragmatic potential of intertextuality in news headlines on the Russian-Ukrainian war in Ukrainian religious media, based on the materials of the websites "Religious Information Service of Ukraine", "Catholic Observer", "Religious Truth", "Spiritual Front of Ukraine", published from the end of February to the beginning of May 2022. It has been established that intertext in the headlines enhances the emotionality of the communicative message in order to shape the intended emotional reaction of the audience to Russian aggression. Intertextual units perform the function of polarizing discourse, increasing the effect of the negative image of the aggressor country and its church leaders, on the one hand, and positive representation of the Ukrainian people in its struggle for freedom, on the other hand. Common sources of intertextuality in religious media are the Bible, historical events, figures and phenomena, works of art, mythological creatures, slogans and mythologemes, the relationship with which emotionalizes communication and enhances the persuasive influence on the recipient by stimulating predictable associations with the source text or symbol. In covering Russian aggression, religious media speakers use biblical apocalyptic images and metaphors, allusions to the suffering of Jesus Christ, the stories of Cain and Abel, David and Goliath. Intertextual units that are originally political slogans or ideologemes, such as the "Russian world" and "protection of the Orthodox", are reappropriated in Ukrainian religious media discourse with the purpose of their discrediting. The article also explores the potential of intertextuality in the field of*

neologization. Some intertextual phenomena from the fields of fiction and history have given rise to linguistic innovations, such as "orcs" and "ruscism", thus revealing a productive way of neologism formation based on intertextual connections with previous texts and cultural phenomena. The article outlines further prospects of the study of emotional reaction of the religious media addressee to intertext-featuring headlines with the involvement of experimental psycholinguistic and corpus methods.

**Key words:** *intertextuality, speech influence, persuasive discourse, religious media, neologisms, Russian-Ukrainian war.*

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## **ІНТЕРТЕКСТУАЛЬНІСТЬ ЯК ДЖЕРЕЛО ЕМОЦІОНАЛІЗАЦІЇ ДИСКУРСУ ТА МОВНИХ ІННОВАЦІЙ**

**Анотація.** У статті проаналізовано прагматичний потенціал інтертекстуальності в заголовках новин про російсько-українську війну в українському релігійному медіапросторі за матеріалами сайтів "Релігійно-інформаційна служба України", "Католицький оглядач", "Релігійна правда", "Духовний фронт України" за період з кінця лютого до початку травня 2022 р. Встановлено, що інтертекст у заголовках посилює емотивність комунікативного повідомлення з

метою стимулювання необхідної емоційної реакції в адресата релігійних медіа щодо російської агресії. Інтертекстуальні одиниці виконують функцію поляризації дискурсу, збільшуючи ефект негативного зображення країни-агресора і його церковних лідерів та позитивного представлення українського народу у його боротьбі за свободу. Частотними джерелами інтертекстуальності у релігійних медіа є Біблія, історичні події, постаті і явища, художні твори, міфічні істоти, гасла та міфологеми, співвіднесення з якими емоціоналізує комунікацію та посилює персвазивний вплив на реципієнта завдяки стимулюванню в нього передбачуваних асоціацій з вихідним текстом чи символом. У висвітленні російської агресії релігійні медіаспікери використовують біблійні апокаліптичні образи та метафори, алюзії на страждання Ісуса Христа, історії Каїна та Авеля, Давида та Голіафа. Інтертекстуальні одиниці, які за своїм походженням є політичними гаслами чи ідеологемами, зокрема "руський мир" та "захист православних", використовуються в українському релігійному медіадискурсі з метою їх дискредитації. У статті також досліджено потенціал інтертекстуальності у сфері неологізації. Джерелом деяких мовних інновацій стали інтертекстуальні феномени у сфері художньої літератури та історії, зокрема "орки" та "рашизм", що свідчить про продуктивний спосіб утворення неологізмів на основі інтертекстуальних зв'язків з попередніми текстами і феноменами культури. Окреслено подальші перспективи у дослідженні емоційної реакції адресата релігійних медіа на заголовки новин з інтертекстом із залученням експериментальних психолінгвістичних та корпусних методів.

**Ключові слова:** інтертекстуальність, мовленнєвий вплив, персвазивний дискурс, релігійні медіа, неологізми, російсько-українська війна.

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The media coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which began on 24 February 2022, requires a comprehensive linguistic exploration, given the significant potential of the media in shaping

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the public opinion. The war provoked an overwhelming reaction of the world community in the information space, in particular the reaction of various Churches and religious institutions. Statements and speeches by religious leaders and media speakers assessing Russian aggression and the phenomenon of war in general often refer to relevant biblical images and symbols. This way, addressers bring an emotional component to media communication, based on the expected reception of biblical intertext in the minds of the addressees. Thus, the study of the pragmatic potential of intertextuality in media communication will contribute to a better understanding of the discursive processes taking place in religious media during the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Russia's aggression against Ukraine has given rise to numerous linguistic innovations and neologisms emerging as a response of the society's linguistic consciousness to the factor of war. Some linguistic innovations are rooted in intertextual phenomena from the areas of fiction and history, such as *orcs* and *ruscism*. Therefore, the linguistic study of the emotionalization potential of intertextuality in the coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian war in religious information space seems extremely relevant.

This article aims to explore the pragmatic potential of intertextuality in shaping the readers' attitude to the war and the functions of intertext in the headlines on Russian aggression in Ukrainian religious media space. The research materials consist of headlines of news reports, analytical reviews, interviews and appeals posted on religious sites "Religious Information Service of Ukraine" (RISU), "Catholic Observer" (CO), "Religious Truth" (RT), "Spiritual Front of Ukraine" (SFU) from the end of February to the beginning of May 2022. The sample comprises fragments on the Russian-Ukrainian war and inter-church relations in Ukraine. The sample size is 250 fragments of discourse, in which 150 intertextual units were identified. Antconc manager was used to systematize, generalize, and classify the intertextual units (<https://www.laurenceanthony.net>).

An important component of media communication is the speech influence on the addressee, i.e. shaping their picture of the world and programming the intended emotional response to the message. In recent decades, speech influence has been the subject of research in the field of pragmatics and discourse, in particular in the works of T. van Dijk [5; 6], D. Maillat and S. Oswald [16; 17], M. Reisigl and R. Wodak [26] and others. Media persuasion is not solely based on argumentative techniques: it also involves the appeal to emotions of the addressee for the purposes of manipulative and suggestive influence [7; 20; 21; 22].

Modern linguistic research has shown that the introduction of intertext in media communication can enhance the speech impact on the recipient, significantly increasing the emotional potential of communication [14, p. 116; 29; 30; 34]. The notion of intertextuality in Ukrainian linguistics is interpreted as "a dialogical connection of a text in a semiotic universe with previous texts" [32; p. 210]. Intertext can be defined as a text of culture semiotically introduced into the communicative message, mainly in the form of allusions and reminiscences. The theory of intertextuality emerged in the writings of Julia Kristeva [10] and was further developed in the works of Roland Barthes [1], Michael Riffaterre [27; 28], Natalie Piege-Gro [25] and others. In Ukrainian linguistics, the phenomenon of intertextuality in the field of language innovations and the functioning of intertext in fiction has been studied by H. Sytar [33], R. Chornovol-Tkachenko [4], O. Selivanova [31], A. Berestova [2], N. Pidubna [23; 24]. The pragmatic potential of intertext in mass media has been extensively investigated by I. Sakharuk (Bohdanova) [3; 29; 30], O. Levchenko [12], Yu. Velykoroda and O. Moroz [35], U. Meinhof and J. Smith [19], C. Hart [7; 8], V. Kalenych [9], I. Mavrodieva [18].

One of the main functions of intertext in media headlines is to emotionalize the discourse, taking into consideration the strong position of the message header in the communicative act. Intertext enhances the speech influence on the recipient by stimulating their supposed associations with the source text, image or symbol

of culture and history. This influence is realized via the appeal of the addresser to the emotionally charged intertextual phenomenon, whose perception in the mind of the addressee is transferred to the described event or phenomenon [3, p. 135; 14, p. 106–107]. Quite often the communicator introduces intertextual units into media communication to construct the opponents' negative representation by associating them with negatively colored precedent phenomena [15, p. 667].

As a result of the analysis of intertextual units in the news headlines on the Russian-Ukrainian war, we have identified the most common source areas that have significant pragmatic potential for emotionalizing the communicative message:

(1) The Bible, for example: *Не можуть Хрест водночас нести Ісус і Пилат, українка і росіянка* "The Cross cannot be carried simultaneously by Jesus and Pilate, Ukrainian and Russian" (CO) – an allusion to the Christ's road of passion leading to Calvary; *Одна церква, два Каїни* "One Church, two Cains" (RISU) – an allusion to the story of Cain and Abel (see Gen. 4: 1–9); *Ессе Номо* "Behold the Man" (RISU) – Latin version of Pontius Pilate's words about Jesus Christ (see John 19:5); *Ісусе, що народився під бомбардуваннями в Києві, змилуйся над нами* "Jesus, born during the bombings of Kyiv, have mercy on us" (CO) – a modified version of Jesus' prayer "Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on us" or an allusion to the words of two blind men "have mercy on us, Son of David" (cf. Matt. 9:27).

(2) Heroes of famous literary works, mythical creatures, for example: *В Ірпені орки спалили тисячі Біблій* "In Irpen, Orcs burned thousands of Bibles" (RISU) – an allusion to the army of humanoid Orc creatures in fantasy novels by J. R. R. Tolkien "The Hobbit" and "The Lord of the Rings"; *Сім голів московської Гідри: голова друга: релігійна / ідеологічна експансія* "The Seven Heads of the Moscow Hydra: Second head: Religious / Ideological Expansion" (SFU) – an allusion to the Lernean Hydra from the cycle of ancient Greek myths about Hercules.

(3) Names of works of art, for example: *Таємниця "Київської мадонни" з метро* "The Secret of the "Madonna of Kyiv" from the metro" (RISU) – an allusion to Madonna, the Catholic name of the Virgin Mary portrayed together with the baby Jesus. The image of the "Madonna of Kyiv" embodies all Ukrainian women who were forced to hide with their newborns in bomb shelters.

(4) Historical figures, for example: *Путінський режим – це реінкарнація Сталіна* "Putin's regime is the reincarnation of Stalin" (RISU) – an allusion to the Secretary General of the USSR J. Stalin and his tyrannical government; *"Ваше ставлення до українців у важкий час нагадує про святу Матір Терезу"*, – *Зеленський до народу Албанії* "Your attitude towards Ukrainians in difficult times is reminiscent of St. Teresa", – *Зеленський до народу Албанії* "Ukraine is under the auspices of the Mother of God" (RISU) – an allusion to the Catholic nun St. Teresa, the founder of charitable missions.

(5) Historical events, phenomena and legends, for example: *Кремлівські варвари зараз руйнують мечеть Султана Сулеймана і Роксолани в Маріуполі* "Kremlin barbarians are now destroying the mosque of Sultan Suleiman and Roksolana in Mariupol" (RISU) – an allusion to the barbarians depicted in the historiographical works of ancient Romans who destroyed Rome; *Україна під покровом Богородиці* "Ukraine is under the auspices of the Mother of God" (RISU) – an allusion to the legend of the apparition of the Mother of God in the Vlahern Church of Constantinople, according to which the Mother of God saved the city from invasion by "covering" it with her omophorion; *Шабаши відьом у Москві. "Генеральна рада" російських відьом підтримує Путіна* "Sabbath of witches in Moscow. The "General Council" of Russian witches supports Putin" (CO) – an allusion to the folklore legends about night gatherings of witches.

(6) Slogans and mythologemes, for example: *Предстоятель ПЦУ закликав духовенство УПЦ МП назавжди порвати з "роскiм мiром"* "Head of the UOC called on the clergy of the UOC-MP to break with the "Russian world" forever" (RISU) – allusion to the ideology of the "Russian world", which underlies

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Russian aggression against Ukraine; *Свій напад на Україну Путін обгрунтовував бажанням "захистити православні цінності" та УПЦ МП* "Putin justified his attack on Ukraine with the desire to "protect Orthodox values" and the UOC-MP" (RISU) – an allusion to the ideology of "protection of the Orthodox", which Russia used to justify its military intervention in Syria, Ukraine and other countries.

Undoubtedly, one of the most important texts for the Ukrainian religious discourse is the Bible. Thus, the presence of biblical intertext in religious media communication, as well as references to biblical images and symbols in the news on the Russian-Ukrainian war, seems reasonable. Having analyzed the fragments of religious media discourse, we singled out the most frequent allusions to the Bible in the war-related reports of religious speakers. These include allusions to biblical stories about Cain and Abel, on the one hand, and David and Goliath, on the other hand, intended to reinforce the negative emotional attitude towards the aggressor country through its association with Cain and Goliath in the reader's mind. Abel as an innocent victim of fratricide embodies Ukraine, and Cain, who enviously and insidiously killed his brother, represents the Russian Federation. The image of Cain is extremely negative in Christian discourse, so the association of Russian aggression with Cain's sin targets an appropriate emotional response to the aggressor country in the audience. Apparently, the frequency of this intertext in the religious media is due to the address of Metropolitan Onufriy, head of the UOC, dated February 24, 2022, where he compared the Russian attack with Cain's sin. Examples of allusions to the images of Cain and Abel in media headlines include: *Хрест Авеля і хрест Каїна – це різні хрести* "The Cross of Abel and the Cross of Cain are different crosses" (RISU), *Одна церква, два Каїни. Як УПЦ МП підтримала обидві сторони у російсько-українській війні* "One Church, two Cains. How the UOC-MP supported both sides in the Russian-Ukrainian war" (RISU).

The allusion to the biblical story of David and Goliath in the war-related headlines in Ukrainian religious media is primarily due to the visual perception of the size of Ukraine and Russia on the political



map, but it also conveys strong faith in Ukraine's victory and emotional solidarity with the feat of David, who defended his army and his people by defeating a mighty giant with a well-aimed blow (see 1 Sam. 17: 49–51). In general, the figure of David in Christian discourse is endowed with positive connotations, both historical and soteriological ones, because Jesus is the son of David, through whom comes salvation to the mankind. Thus, Ukraine's association with David has a clear intention to strengthen faith in Ukraine's unique role in confronting the aggression and tyranny. As the history of David is widely known to religious audiences, implied semantic connotations have significant pragmatic potential in shaping awareness of the historical mission of the Ukrainian people. An illustrative example of the use of this intertext in our sample is: *Моя Україна: Давид і Голіаф* "My Ukraine: David and Goliath" (RISU).

Along with two key biblical allusions, we found many other intertextual connections to the Bible in the headlines under study. In general, religious media tend to portray the Russian aggression against Ukraine in apocalyptic symbols and images, associating its key figures with the dark forces mentioned in the Bible. Some notable examples are: *Не пробачимо ми і Бог не пробачить. Замість Прощеного буде Судний день* "We will not forgive and God will not forgive. The Forgiveness Day will be replaced by the Judgment Day" (RISU); *Йому притаманні ті риси, якими володіє диявол – Митрополит Епіфаній про Путіна* "He has the traits of the devil – Metropolitan Epiphanius on Putin" (RISU); *З Божою допомогою ми здолаємо ворога, здолаємо новітнього антихриста Путіна* "With God's help, we will defeat the enemy, we will defeat Putin, the new antichrist" (SFU); *Анафема не треба. Путін вже накликав на себе пекельні муки* "There is no point in anathema. Putin has already inflicted the torments of hell upon himself" (RISU); *Кирил Гундяєв зробив свій вибір на користь справ антихриста* "Kirill Gundyayev made his choice in favor of the affairs of the antichrist" (RISU); *Ми сьогодні просимо Бога зійти у підземелля Азовсталі й врятувати наших людей з аду* "Today we ask God to descend into the dungeons of Azovstal

and save our people from hell" (CO); *Україна і українці сьогодні – учасники великої битви зі злом, і Бог – на нашій стороні* "Ukraine and Ukrainians today are participants of the great battle against evil, and God is on our side" (RISU); *Битва видима – битва невидима* "Our visible and invisible battle" (PICY); *Наша особиста перемога над злом буде перемогою України в її невидимій боротьбі проти диявола* "Our personal victory over evil will be Ukraine's victory in its invisible struggle against the devil" (CO); *Ми сьогодні постимо і молимося, щоб вигнати диявола, духа війни і смерті* "Today we are fasting and praying to cast out the devil, the spirit of war and death" (CO).

The first example features a play on words, as it juxtaposes Forgiveness Sunday on the eve of Great Lent for Orthodox Christians with Judgment Day, which is repeatedly mentioned in the Bible and whose key themes are forgiveness and punishment (see Matt. 25: 31–46). The news headline *Битва видима – битва невидима* "Our visible and invisible battle" is an allusion to the words of the Apostle Paul on the spiritual war of mankind with invisible spirits, with whom the authors identify Russian invaders: "For our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the powers of this dark world and against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly realms"(Eph. 6:12). Undoubtedly, all of the above examples serve to discredit the enemy and shape the negative attitude towards him in the recipients of the discourse through his association with infernal beings: the devil, the antichrist, the demon of death. At the same time, the depiction of Ukraine's struggle in this war in biblical apocalyptic images of light against darkness reinforces emotional expectations and faith in victory, based on the Bible's words that God overcomes evil and light overcomes darkness (see John 1: 5).

Similarly to biblical allusions with apocalyptic semantic connotations, the analogous function is performed by the allusion to the artistic image of Orcs (from the mythological universe of J. R. R. Tolkien), with whom the Russian invaders are associated. This word is an integral element of a vivid extended comparison: "Ukraine, a

peaceful country comparable to the Shire in the Lord of the Rings, is defending itself against a purely evil force, the Russian army, compared to the troops of Mordor, which are led from Moscow by a Vladimir Putin likened to Sauron" [11]. The use of the word *орки* "Orcs" for Russian troops after February 24, 2022 in various languages confirms its status as an international neologism. This example demonstrates the great potential of intertextuality in the field of language innovation and neologization. The tendency to use the word *орк* "Orc" in various media discourses also extends to the religious segment, despite its conservative nature. Therefore, in sample headlines we come across a significant number of allusions to Tolkien's Orcs, referring to the Russian Federation troops, for example: *Від атак орків постраждали вже 28 релігійних споруд у 6 областях України* "28 religious buildings in 6 regions of Ukraine have already suffered from Orcs' attacks" (RISU), *Кирил подарував Росгвардії ікону, яка "має прискорити перемогу" орків в Україні* "Kirill presented the Rosguard with an icon that "should hasten the victory" of Orcs in Ukraine" (RISU), *На Чернігівщині ракета орків влучила у церкву АСД* "In the Chernihiv region, an Orc rocket hit an SDA church" (PICU), *Російські орки зруйнували дім молитви баптистів в Ізюмі* "Russian Orcs destroyed a Baptist house of prayer in Iziium" (RISU).

Another source of intertext used by religious media speakers to emotionalize the communicative message and strengthen the negative image of the enemy includes historical events, figures and phenomena. The most frequently featured are allusions to the political regimes of Hitler and Stalin, which are also common in other segments of media discourse. To illustrate: *Путінський режим – це реінкарнація Сталіна* "The Putin's regime is a reincarnation of Stalin" (RISU), *Росіяни спляють убитих мирних жителів у Маріуполі, як нацисти це робили в Аушвіці* "Russians burn civilians killed in Mariupol, as the Nazis did in Auschwitz" (CO), *Протестанський пастор з України ловить на живця русофашистів у Німеччині* "A Protestant pastor from Ukraine uses live bait to catch Russo-fascists in Germany" (RISU), У

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*Вознесенській церкві с. Лукашівка рашисти влаштували штаб і гестапівську катівню* "In the Church of the Ascension in Lukashivka village ruscists set up a headquarters and a Gestapo torture chamber" (RISU). However, along with the politicization of reports in the religious media, the Russian Orthodox Church, which has not condemned Russian aggression, is also gaining a negative emotional background. Some headlines suggest the intention of communicators of religious discourse to identify it with the Putin's regime and associate it with the Church that collaborated with Nazi Germany during World War II, for example: *Руська Православна Церква як нова Рейхцерква* "The Russian Orthodox Church as the new Reich Church" (RISU). The title contains a spelling deviation in order to encourage the audience to associate the ROC with the Z symbol used by Russia in the war. Allusion to German Nazism and Italian fascism is also conveyed by the neologism *рашизм* "ruscism", which, along with the word *орк* "Orc", is rapidly entering the lexicon of modern European languages. Here is an example of the use of this word in our sample: *На рахунку злочинів рашистів в Україні вже 86 зруйнованих релігійних споруд* "The list of ruscist crimes in Ukraine already includes 86 destroyed religious buildings" (SFU), *Глава УГКЦ відвідав "зранений" рашистами Чернігів* "The head of the UGCC paid a visit to Chernihiv, a city "wounded" by ruscists" (RISU), *Кирил пояснив дії рашистів в Україні тим, що росіяни хочуть миру* "Kirill explained the actions of ruscists in Ukraine by saying that Russians want peace" (RISU), *Сотні лампадок запалили у Львові в пам'ять про невинно вбитих рашистами українців* "Hundreds of lamps were lit in Lviv in memory of Ukrainians innocently killed by ruscists" (RISU).

One of the important symbols used by Russian media to construct the ideological justification of Russian aggression is based on the "baptismal font" of the Dnieper, where, according to chroniclers, Kyivan Ruthenians were baptized in 988 by Orthodox Greeks. The allusion to "The Tale of Bygone Years" in the headlines in the Ukrainian media is aimed at exposing the manipulation of historical data used by the ideologues of war and

the "Russian world", for example: *У Києва і Москви зовсім різні "Хрещенські купелі"... У нас це Дніпро, а у них – заліські болота* "Kyiv and Moscow have completely different "Baptismal fonts" ... We have the Dnieper, and they have bogs beyond the forest" (RISU), *Україна бореться за Істину, яку ми отримали у хрещальних водах Дніпра* "Ukraine is fighting for the Truth that we received in the baptismal waters of the Dnieper" (CO).

Particular attention should be paid to intertextual units which were originally political slogans or ideologemes. As a rule, these slogans, having emerged in the Russian ideological space, are reappropriated in the Ukrainian religious media in order to discredit them [15, p. 672–674]. These include *"руський мир"* "Russian world", *"захист православних"* "protection of the Orthodox", *"міжусобна брань"* "internecine feud", *"братовбивча війна"* "fratricidal war", *"єдинокровний народ"* "consanguineous people", *"триєдність російського народу"* "triunity of the Russian people", *"розкольники і безблагодатні"* "schismatics and graceless", for example: *Православні богослови світу засудили єресь "русского міра" і ганебні дії російської влади* "Orthodox theologians of the world condemned the heresy of the "Russian world" and shameful actions of the Russian authorities" (RISU), *Кирил звинуватив Захід у постачанні українцям зброї для війни з "єдинокровними братами"* "Kirill accused the West of supplying Ukrainians with weapons for the war with "half-brothers" (RISU), *"Русский мир" став новою релігією росіян* "Russian world has become the new religion of Russians" (RISU), *За словами "розкольники" і "неблагодатні" можна виявляти колаборантів* "The words "schismatics" and "graceless" reveal the collaborators" (SFU), *Священик-втікач з України читатиме в Москві лекції про "триєдність російського народу"* "A fugitive priest from Ukraine will give lectures on the "triunity of the Russian people" in Moscow" (SFU). Most commonly featured in the headlines is the "Russian world" ideologeme, which is associated with all the evil that Russian aggression brings to Ukrainians and in particular to religious communities of all jurisdictions and denominations of Ukraine:

Українська держава має захистити громадян від ідеології "русского мира", яка є ідеологією нацизму "The Ukrainian state must protect citizens from the ideology of the "Russian world" (RISU), "Руський мир" знищує московську церкву в Україні "«Russian world» destroys the Moscow Church in Ukraine" (RISU). According to our previous research, the ideology of the "Russian world" was one of the most frequent precedents in the Ukrainian religious media discourse in 2014-2018 in the field of inter-church relations and interfaith dialogue in Ukraine [14, p. 113; 15, p. 672–673]. Communicators of religious media discourse referred to it to criticize the ROC and UOC-MP [14, p. 111–112] in order to taunt and ridicule the adherents of the doctrine of the "Russian world" [13, p. 50–51].

As a result of the study, we revealed that intertext in headlines on the Russian-Ukrainian war enhances the emotionality of the communicative message targeting the desired emotional response from the audience to the impact of Russian aggression on the lives of Ukrainians in general and religious communities in particular. Intertextual units perform the function of discourse polarization, exaggerating the negative image of the aggressor country and its church leaders, on the one hand, and the positive representation of the Ukrainian people in its struggle for freedom, on the other hand. The biblical intertext plays an important role in depicting the Ukrainians' resistance to Russian aggression, eliciting associations with apocalyptic biblical images in the audience. Common sources of intertextuality in the analyzed segment of religious media are historical figures and phenomena, as well as works of art, whose mention not only serves to emotionalize communication, but also becomes a productive way of neologization and language innovation.

Further research in this area might focus on the speech influence of intertext-featuring news messages on the language consciousness and the level of emotional reaction of the religious media addressees, with the application of experimental psycholinguistic and corpus methods.

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## RESOURCES

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**Дата затвердження редакцією – 01.05.2022**